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Jenoff: As Equal as Others?

AS EQUAL AS OTHERS? RETHINKING ACCESS TO
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Pam Jenoff

“All animals are equal. But some are more equal than others.”1
The purpose of employment discrimination law is to ensure fair and
equal conditions in the workplace by preventing and remedying
differential treatment based on certain protected characteristics, such as
race, sex, and age. However, the federal anti-discrimination claiming
system as presently constructed cannot achieve this mandate. The
current system excludes close to one-fifth of the American workforce
outright, and prevents even greater numbers of individuals from seeking
redress for reasons unrelated to the merits of their claims. Stringent
statutory requisites as to covered employers, administrative exhaustion,
and the limitations period create barriers to access that not only prevent
individuals from obtaining relief but permit discrimination to persist on
a systemic level, hobbling realization of the anti-discrimination
mandate. Thus, there is a fundamental tension between the broad
aspirations of anti-discrimination law and the narrow constraints of the
claiming system intended to enforce it.
Recent scholarship in the employment discrimination area has focused
upon the structure of discrimination claims, i.e., whether the required
elements of proof and burden-shifting framework are effective in
addressing racism, sexism and other biases in the workplace, or whether
a new, more fluid schema is required to capture the complexities of
modern prejudice and its many manifestations. These articles do not
speak to the more fundamental question of access to employment
discrimination law.
This Article argues that there are costs associated with excluding people
from coverage, including significantly diminishing the ability of
discrimination law to eliminate discrimination. The Article shows how
most of the arguments used for limiting the reach of employment law
* The author would like to thank Mike Carrier, Jay Feinman, Kim Ferzan, Ann Freedman, Phil
Harvey, Stacy Hawkins, Kathryn Kovacs, Arthur Laby, John Oberdiek, Paul Secunda, Sandra Sperino,
Rick Swedloff, and Carol Wallinger, as well as the participants at the Sixth Annual Labor &
Employment Law Colloquium in Los Angeles, California, the Rutgers University School of Law–
Camden Faculty Colloquium, and the Rutgers Junior Faculty Workshop for their helpful feedback. The
author is also grateful to Rich Ramones, Danielle Rementer, Lauren Piesieczko and Jacqui HyunhLinenberg for their research assistance.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 32 (2004).
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have never been substantiated, have been diminished by changing
circumstances, or can be alleviated by altering the statutory regimes in
important ways.
This Article breaks new ground by identifying the conflict between the
broad goals of employment discrimination law and the limited
protections of the anti-discrimination claiming system, and proposing
bold systemic restructuring to widen access, while taking into account
countervailing concerns such as overburdening and cost. Part I
examines the evolution of the federal employment statutes. Part II
considers the nature of the barriers to access, their merits as well as the
problems they create.
Finally, Part III re-envisions the requirements of the anti-discrimination
claiming system and offers a proposal whereby: (1) all employees would
be covered by the federal anti-discrimination statutes and given access
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which would have
adjudicative, rather than merely investigative, authority over claims; (2)
individuals employed by larger companies would be permitted to opt out
of the EEOC process and proceed directly to federal court; and (3)
individuals bringing claims in either forum would be given a minimum
two-year statute of limitations in which to do so. These reforms would
better achieve the goal of anti-discrimination law by providing
protection to a wider spectrum of individuals and claims, while enabling
the system to operate more effectively.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of employment discrimination law is to ensure fair and
equal conditions in the workplace by preventing and remedying acts of
differential treatment based on certain protected characteristics, such as
race, sex, and age.2 However, there is a fundamental tension between
the broad goals of anti-discrimination law and the narrow constraints of
the claiming system that purports to enforce it. In reality, the system
protects only a subset of individuals who work for larger entities.
Furthermore, only a fraction of those claims brought by covered persons
are ever heard on the merits. The rest are excluded by the requirements
that would-be plaintiffs bring their claims very quickly and withstand a
protracted administrative agency process in order to seek redress in
court.
The federal anti-discrimination statutes as presently written and
interpreted by the courts contain three principal barriers to access that
prevent individuals from pursuing claims: (1) the minimum-number-ofemployees requirement, or “small business exemption,” which excludes
from the purview of the statutes employers who do not employ a
threshold number of employees;3 (2) the exhaustion requirement, which
mandates an employee file a claim with an administrative agency before
being able to bring her claims in federal court;4 and (3) the statute of
limitations, which bars claims that have not been filed within a specified
period of time.5 The cumulative effect of these barriers to access is to
exclude from coverage a significant percentage of the workforce and
dismiss a great number of claims based on technicalities unrelated to the
merits.
The limited access to the claiming system caused by these barriers has
serious consequences. Individuals whose complaints go unanswered

2. Specifically, the law prohibits discrimination against “any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2011) (emphasis added); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2008); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006); Family & Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (repealed 1974); Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4301 (2011).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2008);
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B) (2009); see also 20 CFR § 1002.34 (2012) (“USERRA applies to all public and
private employers in the United States, regardless of size. For example, an employer with only one
employee is covered for purposes of the Act.”).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5) (2011); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2011); 29 U.S.C.
§ 2617 (2011).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2011); see also
E.E.O.C. v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that Title VII statute of
limitations applies to ADA claims).
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must continue to withstand discrimination in the workplace or suffer the
loss of work and income without remedy. Beyond the implications for
individuals, restricted access to the claiming system precludes
realization of the anti-discrimination mandate. The lack of access to
federal anti-discrimination protection for a significant percentage of the
American workforce obscures the extent of existing discrimination and
prevents enforcement, allowing unlawful conduct to continue in the
workplace.6 Simply put, the claiming system cannot effectively
eliminate discrimination while protecting only a subset of individuals
and claims.
More fundamentally, the limited protection of the current system is
contrary to the anti-discrimination mandate. Anti-discrimination law is
premised upon the notion of fairness and equality. The result of these
barriers to access is essentially “double discrimination,” whereby some
individuals who have faced unfavorable treatment at work are given
protection, while other facing similar adverse treatment are arbitrarily
denied access to the claiming system. Discriminating among the victims
of discrimination is anathema to the most fundamental equality
principles of the law, undermining not only the effective functioning of
anti-discrimination law, but also its expressive or symbolic function.7
Thus, discrimination law as formulated cannot meet its aspirations.
Rather, global and consistent access to the claiming system is needed
because it effectuates the protection of the right of nondiscrimination
which all should enjoy.
Of course, access to the law and its protection is not without
limitation or countervailing concerns. Indeed, access requirements exist
in all areas of the law and here, as elsewhere, careful consideration must
be given to the interests of all parties as well as the system itself.
Despite the difficulties presented by these barriers to access and the
asymmetries among them, the requirements of employer size,
administrative exhaustion and timeliness play a significant gatekeeping
function which cannot be dispensed with wholesale if the system is to
continue functioning. But given the high costs of denial of access to the
employment discrimination claiming system for individuals and the
implications for the anti-discrimination mandate as a whole, it is not
acceptable to allow the happenstance evolution of the common law and
the political compromise needed to effectuate statutory regimes

6. Caroline R. Fredrickson, The Misreading of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The
Diminishing Scope of Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 891 (1991) (noting that part of the problem
with the Title VII and Section 1981 overlap is that plaintiffs can bypass the conciliation mandates of
Title VII).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2023–24 (1996).
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determine the scope of protection. Rather, any limitations on access
must have a strong justification and be well-tailored to effectuate those
aims.
Recent scholarship in the employment discrimination area has
focused upon the structure of discrimination claims, i.e., whether the
required elements of proof and burden-shifting structures are effective in
addressing racism, sexism and other biases in the workplace or whether
a new, more fluid schema is required to capture the complexities of
modern prejudice and its many manifestations.8 These articles, while
making an important contribution to the field, do not speak to the more
fundamental question of access to employment discrimination law.
Understanding the extent to which the current system fails to protect
certain individuals and claims and how such exclusions frustrate the
purpose and efficacy of the anti-discrimination claiming system is a
necessary precursor to any meaningful discussion of the internal
mechanisms of the statutes. The discussion of how the laws operate is
relevant only in the context of those who have access to the law.
Changing the internal mechanisms of the claiming system will have
little effect if a significant percentage of individuals and claims are not
given a seat at the table. The barriers to access cannot be resolved by
merely tinkering with burden-shifting tests. The system requires broad
structural rethinking. It is time to start anew.
This Article contributes to the field by comprehensively addressing
the barriers-to-access problem in anti-discrimination law. This Article
argues that there are costs associated with excluding people from
coverage, including significantly diminishing the ability of
discrimination law to eliminate discrimination. The Article shows how
most of the arguments used for limiting the reach of employment law
have never been substantiated, have been diminished by changing
circumstances, or can be alleviated by altering the statutory regimes in
important ways.
Part I examines the evolution of the federal employment statutes.
Part II considers the nature of the barriers to access, their merits as well
as the problems they create. Finally, Part III re-envisions the
requirements of the anti-discrimination claiming system. Central to this
proposal is the notion that, in order to achieve the broad goals of
8. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011);
Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment Opportunities and AntiDiscrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25 (2011); Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality?
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L. J. 1219 (2011); Kerri Lynn Stone,
From Queen Bees and Wannabes to Worker Bees: Why Gender Considerations Should Inform the
Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 35, 37–38 (2009); Minna J.
Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1439–
40 (2009); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L. J. 643, 644 (2008).
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employment discrimination law, all employees should be afforded some
protection and access to the claiming system. To that end, the Article
proposes a reconfiguration of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the federal administrative agency which handles the
processing of employment discrimination charges, to receive claims of
discrimination from all employees. The EEOC should also be given
adjudicative authority, not just investigative authority, and should be the
primary vehicle for individuals seeking redress from small employers.
Employees of larger entities who do have the option of bringing claims
in court should be given the option of pursuing administrative
adjudication or bypassing the agency and proceeding directly to court in
order to avoid duplicative processes and waste of resources. The
proposal also includes extending the statute of limitations to a minimum
of two years in order to provide adequate time in which to pursue
claims.
By reconfiguring the EEOC to serve as an agency that provides
access for those who need its assistance and providing a longer period of
time in which to bring claims, the proposal would better achieve the
goal of anti-discrimination law by providing protection to a wider
spectrum of individuals and claims while ensuring that the system
operates effectively. Properly reconceived to work together, the access
requirements can actually further the goals of anti-discrimination law.
II. THE FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS9
Federal anti-discrimination law is composed of a series of laws
passed and amended over the past 150 years. The first of these laws
originated in the Reconstruction Era legislation passed after the Civil
War as an attempt to protect the rights of the newly freed blacks and
begin to integrate them into American society.10 Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1886 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to

9. The scope of this article is limited to the “pure” anti-discrimination laws (Section 1981, Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act), which
purport to protect against discrimination in employment based upon a protected characteristic such as
race, age, etc. For reasons discussed more fully in note 26, I have also included for purposes of the
analysis statutes such as the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act, which confer a substantive right to a leave of absence and also contain a
non-discrimination provision for those who exercise rights under the statute. I have not included laws
that relate to wage and hour such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2011). and other
laws that follow the FLSA rubric, such as the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2011).
10. Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will
Employment, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 329, 331–32 (2001).
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sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.11
The language of Section 1981, which prohibits, inter alia,
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, has been
interpreted by the courts to include the contractual relationship between
employers and employees and to provide a cause of action with respect
to discriminatory employment decisions.12 Notwithstanding today’s
complex anti-discrimination scheme and despite the many statutes
which have been passed in the past century, Section 1981 remains a
separate and independent basis for bringing discrimination claims based
on race, ancestry, and ethnicity.13
More than eighty years after passing Section 1981, Congress enacted
the first comprehensive anti-discrimination law, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which addressed many of the lingering areas of discrimination
faced by minorities in the United States, such as public accommodation,
school segregation, and voting registration.14 Title VII of the Act,
which includes the provisions related to employment, provides that it
shall be unlawful for a covered employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin[.]”15
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2011).
12. Grossman, supra note 10, at 330. The Supreme Court attempted to restrict Section 1981 to
the formation of contracts, which would have excluded post-hire conduct. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179 (1989). However in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress explicitly
provided, “[f]or purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Thus, Section 1981 applies to acts at all stages of the employment
relationship. See also Lauture v. IBM, 216 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2000); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999); Spriggs v. Diamond Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018; Fadeyi v. Planned
Parenthood Assn. of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998).
13. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 596, 599 (1988); Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 924 (1993). See also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys. LP, 534 F.3d 1116,
1123 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that Section 1981 “creates a cause of action only for those discriminated
against on account of their race or ethnicity”); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 757 (7th
Cir. 2006) (recognizing Section 1981 claim based on Iranian ancestry).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2011). Also during this period, President Kennedy signed into law
the Equal Pay Act, which required that men and women receive equal pay for work requiring
comparable skill, effort and responsibility. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2011).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2011). Title VII has generally been used to prohibit discrimination
against individuals who belong to groups which have been traditionally oppressed such as racial
minorities and women. However, a number of plaintiffs have purported to bring reverse discrimination

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2

92

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

Now approaching its fiftieth birthday, Title VII has been amended a
number of times in the intervening years.16 However, its fundamental
framework has not changed and it remains the centerpiece of federal
anti-discrimination legislation today. There are two principal types of
claims under Title VII. The first is a disparate treatment claim, whereby
an individual alleges that she was intentionally discriminated against
based upon race, gender, or other protected characteristic.17
Alternatively, claims for discrimination may be brought under a
disparate impact theory, whereby a plaintiff may challenge an
employer’s facially neutral practice or policy as having disproportionate
negative effects on a particular protected group.18
Age is notably excluded from the protected classifications of Title
VII. At the time Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it
considered including age in the protected classes of Title VII but
affirmatively declined to do so.19 However, in passing Title VII,
Congress instructed the secretary of labor to conduct a study with

claims, arguing that they were discriminated against because of being white, male, etc. These cases
most often arise in the context of affirmative action plans, whereby individuals feel that efforts to
increase diversity have somehow been taken at their expense. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1978). Courts have differed in their approaches to reverse discrimination claims
with some claiming that the same prima facie test as regular disparate impact claims, while other courts
require a “plus” factor—something to show that it is the unusual case where an employer discriminates
against the majority. See Andrea B. Short, Discriminating Among Discrimination: The Appropriateness
of Treating Reverse Age Discrimination Differently from Reverse Race Discrimination, 83 N.C. L. REV.
1065, 1067 (2005); Ryan M. Peck, Title VII is Color Blind: The Law of Reverse Discrimination, J. KAN.
B. ASS’N, June 2006; David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on
Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 657, 658–59
(2000).
16. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261 (expanding Title VII
to the federal government as an employer); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 (providing for
compensatory damages for emotional distress and the right to a jury trial). The 1991 Act was a response
to decisions by the Supreme Court which attempted to limit the scope of Title VII. Barbara K.
Bucholtz, Father Knows Best: The Court’s Result-Oriented Activism Continues Apace: Selected
Business-Related Decisions from the 2002–2003 Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 75, 90–91 (2003).
17. In such a case, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) is a member of the protected class; (2) was
qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse action; and that 4) others outside the class were
treated more favorably. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792, 802 (1973). The
employer must proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why the action was taken and then the
plaintiff must show that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 792–93 (referred to
hereinafter as the “McDonnell Douglas framework”). Intentional discrimination claims may also be
based on a theory of systemic disparate treatment, claiming that an employer has a “pattern or practice”
of discriminating against a protected group. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 609 F. Supp.
1281, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
18. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). An employer can defend such an
allegation by showing that there was not a disparate impact, or that there is a business necessity for the
policy or practice.
19. Kelli A. Webb, Learning How to Stand on Its Own: Will the Supreme Court’s Attempt to
Distinguish the ADEA from Title VII Save Employers from Increased Litigation?, 66 OHIO ST. L. J.
1375, 1379 (2005).
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recommendations for “legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in
employment because of age.”20 Consequently, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act was enacted in 1967 to prohibit discrimination
against those age 40 and older.21
Following the passage of the ADEA, there was a lull in the
proliferation of new employment discrimination laws for approximately
twenty years. The early 1990s saw a second wave of anti-discrimination
legislation,22 starting with the Americans with Disabilities Act23 and
continuing with the Family and Medical Leave Act24 and Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.25 These statutes
offered new or expanded protection to certain groups.26 However, they
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265. Consequently,
Secretary W. Willard Wirtz issued a report in 1965, which noted significant differences between age and
other forms of discrimination. It found that the most common form of discrimination against older
workers, “involves their rejection because of the assumptions about the effect of age on their ability to
do a job when there is in fact no basis for those assumptions.” Clint Bolick, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Equal Opportunity or Reverse Discrimination?, CATO INST., Feb. 10, 1987,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa082.html.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2011). The ADEA has several key similarities to Title VII, most notably
the utilization of Title VII’s prima facie case and McDonnell Douglas framework. Rahlf v. Mo-Tech
Corp., Inc., 642 F.3d 633, 636–37 (8th Cir. 2011). However, once a plaintiff has articulated a prima
facie case of age discrimination, the employer must articulate a reason for its action based on
“reasonable factors other than age” for the employment decision. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2011). Courts
have generally interpreted this to be a less onerous standard than the “legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason” an employer must proffer under Title VII and have accepted a wider range of explanations for
an employer’s conduct when the claim is one of age discrimination. See Smith v. City of Jackson,
Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 228–29 (2005). Another difference is that under the ADEA, there is no such thing
as a reverse age discrimination claim whereby a younger person can allege she was discriminated
against. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004).
22. Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 663, 666 (2005).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2011). The ADA goes beyond requiring the absence of discrimination to
require affirmative conduct—that is, an employer must actually take steps to accommodate an
individual’s disability and help her perform the job. For example, an employer might have to provide
adaptive equipment or modify a work schedule or duties. However, an employer may have a defense
where accommodating an individual would be an undue hardship (e.g., if the cost would be prohibitive.)
42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2011); see also Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2008)
(employer not required to manufacture a job to accommodate a disability).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1993). Passed in 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act provides for 12
weeks of unpaid leave in a 12 month period for eligible employees for the birth or adoption of a child,
for the employee’s own serious health condition or for the serious health condition of a family member.
The statute prohibits discrimination against anyone who takes or seeks to take leave under the FMLA.
25. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (1996). USERRA guarantees certain employment benefits while on
military leave and protects the employee’s right to reinstatement upon return from military service,
provided certain eligibility criteria are met. USERRA prohibits discrimination based on military
service.
26. The FMLA and USERRA differ slightly from the previous statutes in that they are enforced
by the Department of Labor, rather than the EEOC. However, they are included for purposes of this
analysis because their discrimination frameworks are similar to the other statutes, because they are
frequently brought in conjunction with the other types of discrimination claims, and because they are an
integral part of the framework that seeks to prohibit discrimination in the workplace.
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differed from their predecessor statutes in that they had an affirmative
component which required employer action beyond simple nondiscrimination.27
III. BARRIERS TO ACCESS
Despite the appearance of a comprehensive federal antidiscrimination scheme, the laws described above provide limited access
to the claiming system. A significant percentage of the American
workforce—close to one-fifth—is excluded from protection under these
laws completely.28 Those who are covered must bring their claims very
quickly and withstand a protracted administrative exhaustion process.29
However, the barriers to access which exclude these individuals and
claims each have a purpose and role within the claiming system, and any
elimination or modification of them would have implications for the
parties involved in employment discrimination claims as well as for the
system itself. Additionally, these barriers to access are not merely
procedural requirements, but rather raise important theoretical questions
about the purpose, scope and effectiveness of anti-discrimination law
and the claiming system which purports to enforce it.30 How can we

27. Title VII does have a limited duty to provide reasonable accommodation for religious
practice. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
28. See Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine in
Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2006) (noting Title VII does not
reach employees in small firms).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011).
30. It is significant to note that the barriers to access vary widely among the statutes and restrict
access to varying degrees. For example, the minimum employee threshold ranges from zero employees
(all employers are covered) under USERRA and Section 1981, to statutes that require an employer to
have 15 employees in order to be covered, such as Title VII and the ADA, to those such as the ADA and
FMLA which have still higher numbers (twenty and fifty employees, respectively.) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2011) (fifteen or more); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (same) (2011); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2011) (twenty or
more); 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2011) (fifty or more); Wagner v. Merit Distrib., 445 F.Supp.2d 899, 905–06
(W.D. Tenn. 2006) (all employers covered by Section 1981); 20 CFR § 1002.34 (2012). Most statutes
require administrative exhaustion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117 (2011). However, claims brought under Section 1981, USERRA and the FMLA have no
exhaustion requirement and plaintiffs can proceed directly to court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011); 29
U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2011). But see Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097,
1105 (9th Cir. 2008) (exhaustion not required for Section 1981 claims); Jacobsen v. Dep’t. of Justice,
500 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (exhaustion not required by USERRA). The statutes of
limitations are also divergent, running from the 300/90 day framework under Title VII to four years for
USERRA and Section 1981 claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011); Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co.,
541 U.S. 369, 371, 374 (2004); 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2011). Such asymmetries are not unique to antidiscrimination law but may be particularly problematic for this area of the law, which is effectuated by
individuals raising and bringing claims as a means of bringing about systemic justice. In a future paper,
I plan to assess the effects of these asymmetries on the claiming system, including the way they affect
an individual’s propensity to claim, influence employer behavior and impinge upon the claiming system,
in order to determine if further harmonization among the access requirements is warranted.
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hope to achieve our goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace
globally while protecting only a fraction of individuals and claims, and
in essence discriminating against the others? Are there types of claims
and individuals who should be excluded from coverage, and if so why?
Is it possible to widen access to the claiming system while enabling the
system to function effectively?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the intent and
effect of each of the three principal barriers to access: the minimum
employee threshold, the administrative exhaustion requirement, and the
statute of limitations.
A. The Minimum Employee Threshold
An initial matter in considering access to the anti-discrimination
claiming system is whether an employer is covered by the antidiscrimination laws.31 Simply put, if an employer does not have the
requisite number of employees, then it will not be covered by the statute
and its employees will not be protected, regardless of how egregious the
discriminatory conduct.32
Three rationales have traditionally been espoused in favor of
excluding small businesses from coverage by discrimination statutes.33
First, the minimum employees threshold is premised upon the notion
that it is too expensive for small businesses to comply with anti31. Generally the minimum number of employees required for coverage is set forth in the
definitional section of the statute as part of the definition of “employer.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2011) (defining an employer for Title VII as an organization employing 15 or more employees for at
least 20 work weeks in the calendar year); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2011) (same); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(2011) (defining employer for ADEA as those with 20 or more employees); 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2011)
(FMLA covers employers who have 50 or more employees for 20 workweeks out of the calendar year).
Some statutes, such as Section 1981 and USERRA, do not specify a minimum number of employees
and so all employers are covered. Wagner v. Merit Distrib., 445 F.Supp.2d 899, 905–06 (W.D. Tenn.
2006) (all employers covered by Section 1981); 20 CFR § 1002.34 (2012) (“USERRA applies to all
public and private employers in the United States, regardless of size. For example, an employer with
only one employee is covered for purposes of the Act.”).
32. Determining the number of employees is not always straightforward. Under the “single
employer doctrine,” affiliated corporate entities may be counted as a single employer for purposes of
determining whether an employer will meet the minimum employee threshold required for coverage
under the statute. See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1267.
33. The minimum employees threshold with respect to Title VII is one part of the larger debate
regarding the treatment of small businesses within the law. See C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter?
An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
1 (2004). Exemptions and other protections for small business, such as the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 603 (2011), which requires agencies to take into account the
implications of proposed regulations on smaller firms, are well entrenched in the law. However, some
scholars are critical of small business exemptions, which are in effect subsidies, arguing that they are
harmful because small firms are responsible for disproportionate amount of social ills and that the costs
of such exemptions outweigh the benefits. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case
Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 539–40 (1998).
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discrimination laws.34 A second reason given for the exemption is that
small businesses need to rely on personal relationships in hiring and
other employment decisions, and should therefore not be subject to the
anti-discrimination mandates.35 Finally, there is a concern that
extending anti-discrimination protection to employees of smaller
businesses would flood the claiming system with additional cases and
overburden it to the point where it cannot function.36
1. Rationales for the Exemption
a. Cost
The primary justification given for the minimum employee threshold
is that of cost, i.e., the notion that small employers cannot afford antidiscrimination laws. As scholars such as Richard Carlson have aptly
noted, cost is a real consideration for employers and must be taken into
account in any contemplated revision of the law.37 However, the cost
discussion tends to be somewhat imprecise and rooted in a number of
untested assumptions, which must be unpacked in order to better
understand their interplay with access and the potential implications of
broadening same.
There are two principal types of cost businesses face with respect to
anti-discrimination law. First, there are the costs associated with
enforcement of the law, which includes the expense of defending against
discrimination lawsuits and charges as well as any potential monetary
award to the aggrieved employee.38 Second, there are the costs of
implementing anti-discrimination law. This includes both the expense
of putting into place preventative measures (such as anti-discrimination
policies and training) and the costs of compliance with the law in
making business decisions.39
Most of the discussion of the cost justification for the small business
exemption in anti-discrimination law has focused upon the cost of
enforcement, that is, the notion that small businesses cannot afford to

34. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1247–48; Adam W. Aston, “Fair and Full Employment” Forty
Years of Unfulfilled Promises, 15 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 285, 293 (2004).
35. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1267.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1267–69.
38. Id. at 1203 n.27.
39. Included in these costs is the development of a complaints procedure, whereby employees
can raise internal complaints of discrimination. This is in some sense both a preventative measure, in
that it allows for early detection of issues and possible litigation avoidance, and a compliance measure,
in that employers have an obligation to detect and investigate incidents of discrimination.
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defend expensive litigation.40 The scenario that is often given is one in
which a small business is sued under an anti-discrimination statute and
required to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on litigation and
possibly damages.41
The cost of enforcement actually embodies two separate cost
concerns: the cost of any potential judgment against the company and
the cost of legal fees to defend against charges or litigation. With
respect to the former, the cost concern appears to be somewhat
overstated. In reality, only a small percentage of employment
discrimination litigation makes it to the trial stage42—a fact that scholars
who emphasize the cost of judgments do not seem to readily
acknowledge.43 Cases are often resolved through alternative dispute
resolution procedures, such as mediation, or settled before ever getting
to court.44 Additionally, judgments in employment discrimination
lawsuits are relatively modest compared to other areas of litigation.45
The legal costs of defending against litigation or charges are a more
pressing concern for small business. Even a single plaintiff lawsuit may
40. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1247–48. Indeed, much of the discussion in the legislative history
of Title VII regarding the need to exempt small business centered around excusing them from liability to
avoid them having to shoulder burden of costly discrimination lawsuit. See also Leykis v. NYP
Holdings, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Congress excused small businesses from
ADEA liability to protect them from having to shoulder the costly burden of defending a discrimination
lawsuit.”).
41. See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1263–64.
42. Approximately five percent of employment discrimination cases reach the trial stage.
LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION IN COURT:
CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987–
2003 29 (2008); see also Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary
Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
45, 49 (2005).
43. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1267–68.
44. Nielsen et al., supra note 42, at iii. Interestingly, to the extent that employment
discrimination cases do reach the courtroom, being a small employer no longer necessarily exempts one
from the costs of employment discrimination litigation. The minimum number of employees threshold
was once considered a jurisdictional requirement. However, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Supreme
Court held that the minimum number of employees requirement was a substantive element of an
employee’s case a question of fact to be raised and argued by the defense during the course of litigation.
546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). Thus, while savvy plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely to recognize the futility of
bringing suit against small businesses and refrain from doing so, small firms may in some cases be
required to engage in litigation just to have a case dismissed based on their size, a fact which partially
undercuts the “cost of litigation” argument. However, the employee of a small business will still
ultimately be precluded from obtaining relief under the statute, resulting in a costly but unproductive
lose-lose scenario for both sides. Jeffrey A. Mandell, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee
Thresholds in Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048–49 (2005); see also
Patten Courtnell, Employers Beware - The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VII’s Employee
Numerosity Requirement Disadvantages Small Businesses, 40 LOY. L. REV. 793, 803 (2007).
45. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1291 n.49 (noting that the average recovery for an
employment discrimination plaintiff in litigation is only $15,000).
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cost upward of a hundred thousand dollars to defend.46 For this reason,
any contemplation of broadening access to the anti-discrimination
claiming system to offer protection to small business employees must
take into account the very real costs of litigation and be designed to
minimize those costs, so as not to cripple small business.47
Beyond the cost of litigation, there is also a concern that
implementation of employment discrimination statutes is itself too
costly.48 Indeed, many of the obligations of the federal antidiscrimination laws today arise prior to any dispute. This shift is a result
of a series of Supreme Court decisions in the late nineties that clarified
the standards for employer liability for discriminatory acts of its
supervisors and provided that employers that take measures to prevent,
detect and remediate discrimination may have affirmative defenses to
liability and punitive damages.49 The effect of these decisions has been
to resituate much of the focus of employment discrimination law to
measures such as anti-discrimination policies and training and complaint
procedures, which are designed to prevent, detect, and remediate
impermissible conduct.
Implementing these policies and procedures are straightforward and
relatively low-cost. These measures can and should be adopted by all
employers, not only for litigation defense reasons but also to ensure a
workplace that is free of discrimination.50 Some scholars such as
Carlson have argued that the per capita costs of anti-discrimination
training and other compliance is more expensive for small employers,
which cannot take advantage of economies of scale.51 However, this
assertion is based on very limited data (comparing the costs for firms
with less than twenty employees with firms that employ more than 500
46. Michael Orey, Fear of Firing: How the Threat of Litigation is Making Companies Skittish
About Axing Problem Workers, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 23, 2007 (noting that a single plaintiff employment
discrimination lawsuit costs a company an average of $100,000 to defend through the summary
judgment stage and $300,000 to defend through trial).
47. Coverage of small businesses by state and local anti-discrimination laws suggests that small
business can bear some of these costs without detrimental effect. However, further empirical study of
the effect of state anti-discrimination laws effect on local and regional job creation would be beneficial.
48. See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1249–50; Courtnell, supra note 44, at 804–06.
49. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 747 (1998); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 529–30 (1999).
50. Aside from any legal requirements, educating employees as to appropriate behavior and
providing means for raising complaints are advisable businesses practices for improving productivity
and morale in the workplace. See Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Anti-Discrimination
Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458–59
(2001). But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2001).
51. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1247–49.
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employees).52 Additionally, the cost difference ($920 for the former
group compared with $841 for the larger) is minimal, much lower than
in other areas of the law from which small businesses are not exempt.53
Finally, the data on which this analysis is based is approximately five
years old, and it is unclear if these cost differences remain as
pronounced with the advancement of the internet, which has given
employers the ability to develop their own preventative programs or
purchase them from vendors for a nominal price.54
Closely related to the preventative costs described above are the costs
that arise from the need to understand and comply with the law.55 These
may include paying attorneys to counsel on what needs to be done with
respect to and taking the steps to comply with the law (e.g.,
documenting an employee’s performance to support a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision or performing
disparate impact analysis with respect to compensation or layoff
decisions).56 These costs are significant and, in fact, more acute for
small businesses without the internal resources of a legal department or
human resources professional with compliance expertise.57 As set forth
in Part III, infra, any proposed broadening of the discrimination
claiming system must include resources to support and educate small
businesses with compliance in order to offset these costs.
Thus the cost arguments made in support of the minimum employees
threshold have varying degrees of merit, but taken collectively are a real
concern for small businesses. However, even accepting the argument
that complying with employment discrimination laws and defending
cases that arise under them is costly, there are still compelling
arguments against the minimum employees requirement as presently
codified. First, to the extent that it is true that smaller businesses cannot
bear the costs of discrimination laws, it is unclear that the number of
employees is the proper metric for determining who should be exempt.58
Is a business with eight employees and a million dollars in revenue any
less able to bear the costs of discrimination laws than a company with
eighteen employees and half a million dollars in profits?59 Nor is there
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1249 n.239. Indeed, in establishing the requirements for employers to invoke a defense
to vicarious liability, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that small businesses might require less
formalized procedures. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 770 n.3 (1998).
55. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1267–68.
56. See id. at 1268.
57. Id. at 1259.
58. See Bradford, supra note 33, at 1; see also Carlson, supra note 28, at 1204 (noting that other
statutory schemes such as the FLSA base coverage on revenues rather than number of employees).
59. But see Carlson, supra note 28, at 1247 (noting firms with few employees often lack
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any empirical basis for the numeric thresholds set forth in the statutes
(e.g., 15 employees to be covered by Title VII),60 which were a subject
of widespread debate with the passage of Title VII and every subsequent
amendment.61
Additionally, the current contours of the small business exemption are
not logically calibrated to the costs of the varying statutes. As described
more fully in note 30, supra, the different federal employment statutes
have different thresholds for the minimum number of employees
required in order for an employer to be covered. However, these
coverage requirements have no correlation to the extent of expenditure
or “cost” an employer is expected to bear under the statute.62 For
example, the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (USERRA), a statute which carries substantial cost in that it requires
employers to provide extended periods of military leave, often with
benefits, has no small employer exemption.63 Conversely, the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which has a similarly onerous leave
requirement, applies only to employers with fifty or more employees.64
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA), which contains some of the
greatest potential employer costs because it requires employers to take
affirmative steps to accommodate individuals with disabilities, has the
same minimum employee requirement as Title VII, which in most
circumstances contains only the negative prohibition against
discrimination.65 If cost is truly driving the small business exemption,
then the statutes should be calibrated to make the most costly statutes
have the highest minimum employee thresholds.
Even where cost is a legitimate consideration with respect to coverage
of small businesses by anti-discrimination law, this is not a justification
for wholesale exclusion, as there are other ways in which potentially
burdensome financial concerns may be ameliorated. A number of the
statutes which have an affirmative obligation, such as the duty to
economies of scale enjoyed by larger firms).
60. See Aston, supra note 34, at 294 (noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act covers employers
with two or more employees); Carlson, supra note 28, at 1198 (noting that the Small Business
Administration defines small business as those with 500 or fewer employees).
61. See Aston, supra note 34, at 292 (discussing Congressional debate over the number of
employees required for coverage).
62. See Michael C. Falk, Lost in the Language: The Conflict Between the Congressional Purpose
and Statutory Language of Federal Employment Discrimination Legislation, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 1179,
1181 (2004) (noting the discrepancies between statutes which prohibit discrimination and those which
require employers to take affirmative steps in favor of a particular group).
63. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.34 (2010).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2009).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2011). Title VII does have a limited
duty to provide reasonable accommodation for religious practice. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
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accommodate a disability under the ADA, to provide a religious
accommodation under Title VII, or to provide leave under the FMLA or
USERRA, contain an “undue hardship” exception which an employer
may invoke to demonstrate that the obligation is too costly to bear as an
excuse from compliance.66 Statutory “escape hatches” such as these, if
properly drafted and interpreted, provide an appropriate mechanism to
take into account the financial constraints faced by small business while
still holding such entities accountable for the most essential of antidiscrimination provisions.67
Perhaps most fundamentally, it is unclear that cost should be the
primary concern or that cost concerns should outweigh the antidiscrimination mandate. Indeed, there is no small business exception for
other expensive laws such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act
and environmental regulations, because in such cases Congress has
decided as a matter of public policy that compliance is sufficiently
critical to outweigh cost concerns.68 Fair and equitable treatment of
individuals under the anti-discrimination laws deserves no less.69
Scholars such as Carlson have argued that global coverage of
environmental laws are more important because the harm caused by an
environmental infraction is much greater than a discriminatory act
whose “effects are not likely to reach beyond the size of the employer’s
small workforce.”70 However, this argument ignores the aggregated
effect of the discrimination that is allowed to persist unreported and
unchecked across one-fifth of the workforce on the enforcement at large.
b. Personal Relationships
Beyond cost, a second justification often articulated in favor of the
small business exception is that small employers need to rely on
personal relationships in hiring and other employment decisions, and for
this reason small employers should not be subject to anti-discrimination
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (hiring a
diabetic for overseas posting would have created an undue hardship by requiring transfer of personnel
among hardship and non-hardship posts with very limited staffing available); 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1)(B)
(2009).
67. See Ernest F. Lidge, III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination
Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 41 (2005). For example, an employer might be able to establish a defense
that a particular employment decision was necessary based on cost or that a particular preventative
measure was too costly to implement. Most of the laws presently contain these types of escape hatches.
However, to the extent additional ones might be warranted in order to comply with small business cost
concerns, those would require substantive statutory changes which are beyond the scope of this article.
68. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1250.
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 20 (1971) (“The committee feels that discrimination in
employment is . . . equally invidious whether practiced by small or large employers.”).
70. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1250.
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mandates.71 This argument is unpersuasive on many levels. First, the
notion that small business needs this exemption to maintain collegial
relations ignores the fact that personal relationships are not unique to
small business.72
Larger workplaces also function based on
interpersonal relationships and manage to do so within the parameters of
the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Even if some personal preferences should be taken into consideration
in the small-business context, it is clear that certain behaviors, such as
sexual harassment, are never justifiable. The present framework, in
which small employers are completely excluded from the purview of
most federal anti-discrimination laws (including the sex discrimination
provisions of Title VII), leaves employees of these smaller businesses
excluded from protection against egregious harassing conduct.
As with the “undue hardship” exception, which may serve as an
effective counterbalance to small businesses’ assertion that it should be
excluded from coverage based on cost, there are other ways to address
concerns about any purported justifications such entities may have for
taking personal relationships into account. Most anti-discrimination
laws utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework, whereby once a
plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, the employer may proffer a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken.73 In age
discrimination cases, the employer’s burden is slightly modified, and an
employer may base its decision on “reasonable factors other than age.”74
Allowing small business to justify employment decisions based on
personal relationships that are not discriminatory may provide a vehicle
for ameliorating this concern without wholesale exclusion from
coverage. To the extent that an employer’s decision based on “personal
relationships” cannot be distinguished from discriminatory preferences,
those actions should be prohibited, as to do otherwise would undercut
the purpose of the anti-discrimination laws.
At its core, the “personal relationships” justification for the small
business exemption is representative of the larger complaint that
personnel decisions are within the purview of a business and that the

71. For example, in debating whether the minimum employees threshold should have lowered
from twenty-five to eight in the context of the proposed 1971 amendments to Title VII, some legislators
argued that these businesses, often family-run, would likely hire the friends and relatives or those of the
same ethnicity of the owner. See 118 CONG. REC. 2409–10 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1972) (statement of Sen.
Fannin); 118 CONG. REC. 3171 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin); see also Armbruster
v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983).
72. Aston, supra note 34, at 308. See also Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp.
526, 528 (1993) (noting that Congress likely enacted small business exemption to allow hiring of friends
and relatives).
73. McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2009).
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government’s regulation in this area is an intrusion into this private
property right. This concern is legitimate with small business as with
enterprises of every size. However, in enacting the anti-discrimination
laws, Congress has made the determination that the right of individuals
to be free from prejudice and harassment in the workplace is a
sufficiently important value to our society to warrant some intrusion
upon this private property right, subject to consideration of the various
aims and interests involved. Small business is not sacrosanct and should
not enjoy unfettered latitude to discriminate in its personnel decisions.
Rather, it should be subject to the anti-discrimination mandate in a
manner that takes into account the unique concerns of the small firm.
c. Overburdening
A third principal argument in favor of the small business exemption is
that allowing claims by employees against small businesses would open
up the litigation floodgates and make the system unworkable.75 This
concern essentially recognizes that there is an inherent tension between
providing widespread access to the claiming system and managing the
workload of the system so that it can effectively process and resolve
disputes.76
Based on the estimate that almost one-fifth of the American
workforce is currently excluded from protection, and the corresponding
possibility that claims could rise as much as twenty percent, the concern
is understandable. As Lawrence Friedman observed:
[H]ow much access to justice do we really want? Let us try to imagine a
world in which everyone who had any claim whatsoever could get a
hearing, had inexpensive and convenient access to counsel, and
presumably could get his claim resolved in his favor. Would this be a
77
good society? It could be an Orwellian nightmare.

Most notably, any liberalization of the access requirements would
result in significantly more litigation in the courts, and this additional
workload would impede judicial efficiency and prevent many cases
from being heard.78 There are two primary variables in assessing access
to justice. The first is the number of people who can seek redress under
the system, which is one of the primary concerns of this Article in
focusing upon those excluded from coverage. However, there is a
second factor—whether, once folks have access to the system, their
75. See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1268.
76. Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 3, 4–5 (2010).
77. Id. at 7.
78. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1267.
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claims can be adjudicated promptly. If the system is so overwhelmed
that it takes years to be heard, then the system will be effective for
none.79
Such questions of access and efficiency are not unique to employment
discrimination claims, but are present in virtually all areas of the law
where individuals or entities are seeking access to the judicial system,
and careful consideration must be given here as elsewhere to these
competing aims. However, this “overburdening” argument must not be
seen as a roadblock to allowing access to the employment discrimination
claiming system. The small business exemption in its present form
arbitrarily excludes a significant portion of the workforce from the antidiscrimination claiming system entirely. Adopting such an argument—
that access to remedies should be limited to a certain group of workers
in order to not flood the system—essentially reflects a value judgment
placing the rights of a small subset of individuals above the ability for
all to seek redress. This is clearly contrary to the purpose of Title VII to
broadly prevent and eradicate workplace discrimination.80
2. The Price of Exclusion
The small business exemption has serious consequences on a number
of levels. First, small firms employ approximately nineteen million
individuals.81
Their exclusion from the coverage of the antidiscrimination laws means that a significant portion of the American
workforce has virtually no protection whatsoever under federal antidiscrimination law.82
79. See Marcia L. McCormick, The Equality Paradise: Paradoxes of the Law’s Power to
Advance Equality, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 515, 515–16 (2007) (generally discussing the challenges
of utilizing scarce resources to effectuate broad change in the civil rights context).
80. As discussed in note 44, supra, with respect to cost, the overburdening argument has
similarly been undercut to some extent by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y. & H.
Corporation that the minimum number of employees is not a procedural requisite but a question of fact.
546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). As a result, some portion of these cases may already be taxing the system
until the point at which a judge or jury decides that the employer is not covered by the statute. See
Courtnell, supra note 44, at 797–98.
81. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1199; see also Christine Neylon O’Brien & Stephanie Greene,
Employee Threshold on Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes: A Matter of the Merits, 95 KY. L. J. 429
(2006–2007). Significantly, this number does not include contingent workers or independent
contractors, who may account for as much as one-third of the U.S. workforce, and who are often
excluded from the protection of anti-discrimination law. Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent
Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 863–64 (1995); Mary
E. O’Connell, Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity of Contingent Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 889, 889–90 (1995). The exclusion of this segment of the workforce presents unique problems
and will be the subject of a future article.
82. See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1199. See also H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 20 (1971) (“Because
of the existing limitation in the bill proscribing the coverage of Title VII to 25 or more employees or
members, a large segment of the Nation’s work force is excluded from an effective Federal remedy to
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The exemption created for those employers who fall below the
minimum employee threshold is not just problematic in that it excludes
a large number of workers, but also because of the group that it
excludes. Those who work at smaller businesses have more need for
protection because such businesses are less subject to the public eye.83
Additionally, in a small workplace there may not be a human resources
department or complaint mechanism for an employee to utilize outside
of the manager about whom she is alleging discrimination. Thus, it is
even more important for these employees to have access to external
remedies.
These exclusions are also harmful in that they obscure the full extent
of discrimination in the workplace. Individuals without legal redress
have little incentive to raise complaints where no remedies are available
to them.84 Those who are not covered by the anti-discrimination statutes
are similarly not protected by their anti-retaliation provisions and thus
will not complain and risk retribution at work.85
Thus, discrimination in workplaces that are not covered is allowed to
persist unchecked.86 Indeed, the problem of discrimination within firms
exempted from coverage has been well-documented.87 Empirical
studies demonstrate that small firms are significantly less likely to hire
blacks and other minorities.88 For example, one study demonstrated that
small firms are significantly less likely to hire minorities.89 The study
was performed with multiple regression analysis to account for other
redress employment discrimination.”).
83. See Aston, supra note 34.
84. More empirical research is needed to understand the effect of the small business exemption
on the likelihood of individuals employed by those entities to raise complaints. However, studies have
shown a correlation between perceptions of inclusion within the protected class and an individual’s
willingness to complain. See Barry M. Goldman, Toward an Understanding of Employment
Discrimination Claiming: An Integration of Organizational Justice and Social Information Processing
Theories, 54 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 361 (2001). See also Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 22, at 674
(discussing an individual’s available redress under Title VII).
85. Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming Discrimination, HANDBOOK OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 297 (2005) (addressing the fear of
retaliation and its effects on an individual’s propensity to bring a claim).
86. See Aston, supra note 34. As the legislative history to the 1972 amendments to Title VII
notes, “small establishments have frequently been the most flagrant violators.” S. REP. NO. 92-415, at
59 (1971).
87. See Harry J. Holzer, Why Do Small Establishments Hire Fewer Blacks Than Large Ones?,
33 J. HUM. RESOURCES 896 (1998) (discussing why there is greater inclination among larger firms to
hire black applicants); William J. Carrington et al., Using Establishment Size to Measure the Impact of
Title VII and Affirmative Action, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 503 (1995); see generally Kenneth Y. Chay,
The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on Black Economic Progress: Evidence from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 51 INDUS. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 608 (1998); James P. Smith
& Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 269, 269 (1984).
88. Holzer, supra note 87, at 896.
89. Id.
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factors (such as the geographic location of small firms relative to the
minority workforce.)90 However, the disparity persisted, leaving the
author to conclude that discrimination was the most plausible
explanation and conclude that remedies at small businesses were
needed.91
Similarly, significant growth in opportunities for minorities and
women has been seen following expansion of coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws.92 One study found that following passage of the
1972 Act, black employment share grew, wage gap narrowed, and there
were significant inroads into certain occupations. This conclusion is
further supported by studies that have shown migration of women and
blacks to jobs in larger companies following the passage of Title VII.93
Beyond the functional costs of exclusion, there are broader
conceptual issues. Restricting employment protection to a subset of the
workforce is also contrary to the purpose of anti-discrimination laws: to
remedy discrimination in the American workplace.94 Excluding
discrimination to persist unchecked for a large portion of the workforce
undermines the expressive function of anti-discrimination law, which is
to signal clearly that discrimination in any workplace is unacceptable.95
Instead, the limited access to anti-discrimination law sends a contrary
message—that preventing and addressing discrimination in the
workplace is not of paramount concern, but is secondary to businesses
needs and politics.
The small business exception has other drawbacks too. Businesses
may be less likely to hire more employees or may engage in
disingenuous subcontracting arrangements in an attempt to keep their
employee numbers low and avoid coverage.96 Such subterfuge not only
has the potential to obscure the true extent of discrimination in the
workplace, but may also deny individuals the benefits they would
receive if the company were to recognize them as true employees.97
Those in support of the small business exception would argue that

90. See id. at 909.
91. Id. at 908–09.
92. See Chay, supra note 87.
93. Carrington, supra note 87, at 504.
94. See 109 CONG. REC. 25688 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1963) (noting that the purpose of Title VII is
to “eliminate, through the utilization of formal and information remedial procedures, discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin”).
95. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 2043–44.
96. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1247. See also C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory
Exemptions, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 857 (2004) (noting that firms have an incentive to modify
behavior to fit within the exemption to avoid cost).
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the problems presented by “nonemployees” and the growth of the contingent workforce).
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individuals who are denied access to the federal anti-discrimination
claiming system by virtue of their employer’s size are protected in many
cases by state or local laws, which may have no minimum employee
threshold or one that is lower than the federal laws.98 However, the
coverage of state and local laws vary widely and the effect is to leave
some employees with little or no protection. Moreover, even where
state anti-discrimination laws exist, research suggests that they have
been less effective than the comprehensive federal scheme at remedying
discrimination.99
For example, studies have concluded that
notwithstanding the existence of state anti-discrimination laws, women
and minorities have made significant gains in employment opportunities
and wages after the passage of Title VII only in entities that are
covered.100 Scholars have suggested that state anti-discrimination
regimes tend to be less effective because they rely more upon agency
enforcement than conferring a private right of action.101
In sum, the net effect of the small business exception as presently
codified is to leave a vast segment of the workforce unprotected. While
the overburdening and cost concerns deserve further consideration, they
do not justify wholesale exemption of small business from antidiscrimination law.
B. Administrative Exhaustion
For those employees who are protected by the federal antidiscrimination statutes, the road to court is far from simple. Rather,
there are a series of roadblocks and hurdles an individual must navigate
to gain access to the claiming system. The largest of these is exhaustion
of administrative remedies.102
Exhaustion is the concept that, under the majority of antidiscrimination laws, a putative plaintiff must file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or equivalent state or local
agency prior to bringing suit in federal court.103 Under the exhaustion
98. Carlson, supra note 28, at 1253–54; see also David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of
American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–
1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2011).
99. See generally Carrington, supra note 87.
100. See id.
101. See Engstrom, supra note 98, at 1104.
102. Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA all require exhaustion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011);
29 U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2011). Claims brought under Section 1981, USERRA and
the FMLA have no exhaustion requirement and plaintiffs can proceed directly to court. See Surrell v.
Cal. Water Service Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (exhaustion not required for Section 1981
claims); Jacobsen v. Dep’t. of Justice, 500 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (exhaustion not required by
USERRA).
103. Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA all require exhaustion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2011);
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process, a claimant files a charge with the EEOC or a state or local
agency that has been delegated authority to receive such charges by the
EEOC.104 An agency staff person investigates the charge, interviewing
the complainant and employer representatives and soliciting documents
and information.105 The employer is often asked to submit an answer to
the charge as well as a position statement setting forth its explanation in
greater detail. The agency may also hold a fact-finding conference at
which the complainant provides her version of the alleged
discriminatory events and the employer offers witnesses to provide its
explanation for what took place.106 The agency will ultimately issue a
determination concluding that there either is or is not probable cause
that discrimination occurred.107 If the agency finds no probable cause
that discrimination took place, it will issue a “right-to-sue” letter and the
claimant can then go file a complaint in court.108 If the agency finds
cause then it can opt to pursue the matter further itself or decline to do
so and advise the complainant of her right to proceed to court.109
Throughout the agency process, the investigator will make attempts to
mediate and settle the controversy.110 A plaintiff may request a right-tosue letter, and the agency will terminate its investigation.111
29 U.S.C. § 626 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2011).
104. In 2010, the EEOC received 99,922 charges nationwide. Enforcement Statistics, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Enforcement Statistics]; see also Katherine A. Macfarlane, The
Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional” Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts
Require That Allegations Be Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 GEO.
MASON. U. C. R. L. J. 213, 215 (2011); The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter Charge Handling].
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15 (2009). Documents are generally provided to the agency but not shared
with the adverse party without the consent of the party which submitted them. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22
(2009).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15 (2009). Conferences are less formal than a hearing and are not recorded
or transcribed. Each side is able to hear the other speak.
107. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.18–.19 (2009). The EEOC found no probable cause for discrimination in
64.3% of the approximately 105,000 charges it resolved in 2010. Enforcement Statistics, supra note
104. It found probable cause in 4.7%. Id. The remaining 25.8% of charges were either settled or
administratively resolved. Id.
108. Charge Handling, supra note 104.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (2010). See also Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining
the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 5–6 (1996).
110. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (2009); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (2010). The EEOC mediated or settled
approximately 10% of the charges it resolved in 2010. Enforcement Statistics, supra note 104.
111. See David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law: Doorway into
the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. L. REV. 145 (1995); Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC,
63 SMU. L. REV. 1237 (2010). Regulations do provide that a claimant may request a right-to-sue letter
and that the agency can issue the dismissal letter at any point 180 days or later after the filing of the
charge, or at any point sooner than 180 days if the agency concludes that it will be unlikely to complete
an investigation within 180 period. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2010). However, this argument hardly
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Perhaps most significant is what happens after the conclusion of the
agency process. Whether the agency finds probable cause or not, the
complainant may then file a complaint in federal court.112 The process
effectively begins anew, with the employee filing another complaint and
the employer responding.113 While an EEOC investigator’s finding of
probable cause of discrimination may be admitted as probative,
testimony and evidence from the administrative agency process are
given little or no weight, and dismissal letters indicating that the agency
did not find probable cause of discrimination are generally
inadmissible.114 Parties in litigation may subpoena the investigator’s
file; however, they will generally be given only the documents
submitted to the agency by the parties (which may be obtained from the
adverse party through discovery anyway).115 The investigator’s notes
and internal agency correspondence will not be produced but will be
withheld under the governmental deliberative process privilege. 116
There has been considerable debate among scholars as to the value of
the administrative exhaustion requirement and the role and value of the
EEOC.117 The agency, as originally conceived, theoretically has a
number of meritorious purposes. First, the EEOC is intended to serve as
an investigative body, exploring allegations of discrimination and
determining whether or not it has taken place.118 Properly undertaken,
this function can both remedy and deter unlawful behavior in the
supports the merits of the agency process. At a minimum the complainant will need to wait weeks or
months for the right-to-sue letter to be issued, and will still have had to go through the time and effort of
filing a charge without any consideration of the merits. The employer and the agency itself may have
already expended resources by this point as well.
112. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.18, .21 (2010).
113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 7.
114. See Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, 627 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2010) (probable cause
finding was admissible as probative evidence); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 758 F.Supp. 1182
(S.D.Tex. 1991) (EEOC’s dismissal for lack of probable cause not admissible); Tulloss v. Near North
Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Gillin v. Fed. Paper Board Co., 479
F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1973) (EEOC investigative file not admissible because it was a “mish-mash of selfserving and hearsay statements and records; . . . justice requires that the testimony of the witnesses be
given in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination”).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (2010).
116. See John Louis Kellogg, What’s Good for the Goose . . . Differential Treatment of the
Deliberative Process and Self-Critical Analysis Privileges, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 255,
256 (1997).
117. See Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC’s Challenges and Successes and
Emerging Trends in the Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 133 (2007); Selmi, supra
note 109; Modesitt, supra note 111; Belt, supra note 111, at 159; Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 218
(noting that requiring a plaintiff to first administratively exhaust with the EEOC is in part an attempt to
ensure that the agency has a meaningful role in implementing the laws that it was created and
empowered to enforce).
118. Originally the powers of the EEOC were limited to investigating and conciliating charges of
discrimination. However, the 1972 amendments to Title VII also gave the EEOC power to bring
lawsuits either on behalf of an individual or on its own. Selmi, supra note 109, at 6.
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workplace.119
Second, the agency process is intended to foster legal access to
redress, particularly for individuals who cannot find or afford an
attorney and who are unable to navigate the legal system on their
own.120 Anyone can contact the EEOC and file a charge of
discrimination, using the agency’s straightforward “check the box”
form. The complainant does not have to pay a filing fee and can avail
herself of the aid of an agency staffer in filing.121 EEOC charges require
considerably less specificity than filing a complaint in court, requiring
only that the plaintiff sufficiently identify the parties and “describe
generally the action or practices complained of.”122
Finally, the administrative process is intended to play a conciliatory
role, facilitating resolution of employment disputes without the time and
expense of litigation, thereby lessening the workload of the judiciary.123
When an employer learns from the EEOC that an employee has filed a
charge, this may be the first notice it has of any issue, and sometimes the
problem may be resolved internally with little or no agency interference.
The EEOC also offers a mediation track, which the parties may
voluntarily opt to enter prior to investigation of the charge.124 Other
times, disputes may be resolved through the investigative fact-finding
process, which may alert an employer to the fact that wrongdoing has
taken place and facilitate settlement. The time and effort required to
defend a charge can also incentivize an employer to settle as a business

119. See Belt, supra note 111, at 159; see also Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 218 (noting that
requiring a plaintiff to first administratively exhaust with the EEOC is in part an attempt to ensure that
the agency has a meaningful role in implementing the laws that it was created and empowered to
enforce).
120. Cf. Belt, supra note 111, at 189.
121. Selmi, supra note 109, at 6.
122. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2009). As discussed more fully in Part III(C) infra, the gulf
between the liberal requirements for an EEOC complaint and the requirements for filing a well-pled
complaint in federal court is perhaps more significant in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
requiring that plaintiffs plausibly plead a cause of action. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading
Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011).
123. See Benjamin J. Morris, A Door Left Open? National Railroad Passenger Corporation v.
Morgan and its Effect on Post-Filing Discrete Acts in Employment Discrimination Suits, 43 CAL. W. L.
REV. 497, 502 (2007) (“The exhaustion requirement plays an important role of encouraging settlement
through conciliation and voluntary compliance during administrative proceedings, which ‘would be
defeated if a complainant could litigate a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the
EEOC.’”) See also B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting purpose
of EEOC exhaustion is to afford the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge); Brown v. Puget
Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Title VII places
primary responsibility for disposing of employment discrimination complaints with the EEOC in order
to encourage informal conciliation and foster voluntary compliance with Title VII.”).
124. See Earp, supra note 117, at 144–50. (noting that as many as one third of employees age 65
and older also file a disability discrimination claim).
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decision, irrespective of the litigation risk. Conversely, the agency
process may serve to educate a would-be plaintiff as to the lack of merit
to her claims or unlikelihood of succeeding in court. Simply being
heard through the charge process can provide sometimes the plaintiff
with the redress she seeks. In these various ways, exhaustion can be an
effective dispute resolution tool.125
Scholars point out that, despite the laudable aims of the EEOC, the
gulf between the intent and reality of the exhaustion requirement is
vast.126 In practice, the EEOC is a highly overburdened agency.127 The
number of claims filed with the EEOC has increased exponentially in
recent years, while the staff and resources to process them have
remained relatively unchanged.128 As a result, an investigation of a
charge can often take many months.129 This presents particular
problems for the current employee who has exposed himself to
retaliation or other potentially adverse consequences by virtue of filing a
complaint and then must sit in the place of employment during the
lengthy agency process. It also causes issues for the former employee
who is now unemployed as a result of the allegedly unlawful workplace
discrimination and whose monetary redress is delayed by the
administrative process.130
In addition to the length of time for charge processing, a second major
criticism of administrative exhaustion is that it in fact offers no relief to
the overwhelming majority of individuals who file charges. Most
claimants who wait out the agency’s determination simply receive a
“right-to-sue” letter indicating that the agency did not find probable
cause of discrimination, and that the plaintiff has ninety days to file a
complaint in federal court.131 Thus, the plaintiff is left in the same
125. Cf. Selmi, supra note 109, at 51. The EEOC mediated or settled approximately 10% of the
charges it resolved in 2010. Enforcement Statistics, supra note 104. See also Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81 (2006) (“[E]xhaustion promotes efficiency. . . . Claims generally can be resolved much more
quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court. In some
cases, claims are settled at the administrative level, and in others, the proceeds before the agency
convince the losing party not to pursue to matter in federal court.”).
126. See generally McCormick, supra note 79; Selmi, supra note 109; Modesitt, supra note 111;
Belt, supra note 111, at 159; Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 218.
127. From 2001–2008, the agency lost 25% of its staff. In 2008 the agency had 600 investigators
nationwide to investigate over 95,000 new charges. Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 230 (citing Hearing
on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2010 Before the Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 38 (2009)) (statement of Gabrielle Martin, President,
National Council of EEOC Locals) [hereinafter Martin Statement].
128. Belt, supra note 111, at 153.
129. The EEOC once required that investigations be concluded within 180 days but the average
time to investigate a charge is now 229 days. Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 230.
130. As of 2008 the agency had a backlog of over 73,000 charges filed by “people who believed
they were discriminated against on the job, still waiting for help.” Martin Statement, supra note 127.
131. The EEOC found no probable cause for discrimination in 64.3% of the approximately
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position she would have been in without having to exhaust
administrative “remedies”—or perhaps a worse position, because all of
the witnesses, documents and other evidence needed to prove his case is
that much more temporally removed and stale or perhaps unavailable.
The length of the EEOC process, coupled with the limited number of
cases in which it actually effectuates any meaningful relief, means that
the deterrence value of the agency is also marginal.132
The slow nature of the administrative process coupled with the
remote likelihood of any substantive outcome may have larger
deleterious effects. To the extent that an aggrieved individual views the
system as ineffective, she may be less likely to bring claims and risk
exposing herself to possible adverse consequences of complaining with
little hope of relief.133 The EEOC may also be of limited deterrence
value if employers perceive the administrative process to be a nuisance
rather than one with prompt and actual consequences.
Scholars also question the qualitative value of the agency process.134
The EEOC investigators are not judges or attorneys, but civil servants
without any formal legal training, a fact which gives rise to questions of
their capability to assess employment disputes.135 There are no formal
discovery rules in the agency process, and none of the evidentiary rules
such as hearsay apply. This lack of training and procedure raises
questions as to the validity of the factual investigation and the proper
application of the law in these cases.136
Scholars similarly debate the role of administrative exhaustion in
today’s anti-discrimination law landscape.
Once upon a time,
administrative complaints were an employee’s first line of defense, and
external assistance when there was no other option. However, as
explained in Part III(A) supra, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Faragher, Ellerth and Kolstad in the late 1990s fundamentally shifted
the American workplace. Employers now have vast incentives to put
processes in place to prevent, detect, and remediate discrimination and
otherwise demonstrate good faith efforts to comply with antidiscrimination laws as a means of escaping liability and punitive
damages. As a result, companies have developed extensive complaint
procedures of which an employee may avail herself. These internal
complaint procedures have in some sense supplanted the agency
104,000 charges it resolved in 2010. See Enforcement Statistics, supra note 104.
132. See Selmi, supra note 109, at 49.
133. See generally Major & Kaiser, supra note 85.
134. See Selmi, supra note 109; Modesitt, supra note 111; Belt, supra note 111, at 159;
Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 218.
135. Investigators are often not trained on new developments in the law or new laws themselves.
Macfarlane, supra note 104, at 231.
136. See id.
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function in that they provide the employee with a first avenue of
complaint. They also provide notice to the company of potential issues
and problems, allowing the employer to perform an investigation and
provide redress before a formal dispute ever arises. Indeed, employees
are expected to exhaust these internal complaint procedures before filing
a complaint.137 Given the redundancies between internal and agency
complaints, it is unclear that mandatory exhaustion is as necessary or
relevant in a post-Faragher world.138
Aside from the criticisms of the agency process itself, the fact
remains that mandatory administrative exhaustion is something of an
anomaly in the law. For example, those alleging other types of federal
claims do not generally have an administrative exhaustion requirement,
nor do those pursuing state law claims such as personal injury or tort
claims. The reasons for mandatory exhaustion also seem vague. If the
purpose is to assist would-be plaintiffs in gaining access to the law, then
requiring all plaintiffs to file charges—even those who are perfectly able
to find an attorney and proceed to court—seems counterintuitive.
Hampering their claims from reaching court for an extended period
similarly contradicts that purpose.
Conversely, if the purpose of exhaustion is to serve as a gatekeeping
function and limit the number of employment discrimination cases
entering the court system, there is no evidence that this is working
either.139 Any individual who brings an administrative charge can
ultimately receive a right-to-sue letter and proceed to court. Indeed, the
rise in employment charges has seen a corresponding increase in federal
employment discrimination litigation.140
C. Statute of Limitations
The third barrier to access faced by employment discrimination
claimants is the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are not
unique to employment discrimination law, but rather exist for virtually
137. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 22, at 686. The standard developed by the Supreme Court
in Faragher and Ellerth requires an employer to show not only that it had processes in place to detect
and remedy discrimination but that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of those
avenues. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998). Thus it is incumbent upon the employee to utilize the complaint mechanism.
138. This is not to suggest that a company’s internal investigation would be as objective as that of
the EEOC. Indeed, recognizing the potential for bias among its own employees, some of whom may be
been decision makers, companies often hire external investigators in order to obtain a more impartial
investigation. See David I. Weissman, Proper Workplace Investigations, 56 H.R. MAG. 1, May 1, 2011.
139. See Belt, supra note 111, at 146 (“Consequently, the EEOC has had to abrogate much of its
“filtering” responsibility to the court system, which is, as a result, overburdened with discrimination
claims.”).
140. Id. at 154.
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every type of legal claim. The time period in which a party must bring a
claim may be specified within the statute, borrowed from an analogous
provision in another federal or state law, or determined by the court as a
matter of common law.
The purpose of setting a statute of limitations is to require plaintiffs to
act promptly on claims and not “sit on” their rights, so that defendants
such as employers are aware of and can cap any potential liability, and
that claims are adjudicated while memories are fresh and records still
being kept.141 As the Supreme Court explained, the setting of a time
period for filing suit “reflects a value judgment concerning the point at
which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by
the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”142
While the purpose behind the statute of limitations exists across
virtually all areas of the law, the statute of limitations is much shorter
for employment discrimination cases than for other types of claims.
Many laws have four or even six year statutes of limitations.143 By
contrast, most employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, the
ADA and the ADEA, provide that an employee must bring a claim to
the EEOC within 180 days.144 This may be extended to 300 days when
there is a work sharing agreement between the EEOC and a state or
local agency.145 Then after the agency investigates and issues a right-tosue letter, a plaintiff must file a complaint within ninety days or lose the
right to do so.146
The legislative history and other background materials on the federal
anti-discrimination statutes fail to demonstrate any compelling basis for
this shorter statute of limitations. One possible rationale is employer
notice. Arguably, employment claims by their nature rely more heavily
upon the recollection of witnesses. If a would-be plaintiff waits too long
to file a complaint, memories may become vague or the witnesses
themselves may leave the company. However, these same types of
concerns with staleness are present with other types of litigation as well.
Moreover, even if such an argument would support the shorter 300-day
statute of limitations on the front end (i.e., filing with the EEOC), it
would not explain the very brief ninety-day period for filing a complaint
141. See Cook v. City of Chi., 192 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1999).
142. Morris Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 260 (1980).
143. For example, the federal catch-all statute of limitations of four years is generally held to
apply to federal statutes which do not contain a statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2002).
144. Longer statutes of limitations are provided for certain other employment discrimination
statutes, including Section 1981 and USERRA which borrow the four year statute of limitations, and the
FMLA which provides a two-year statute of limitations (extended to three years for willful violations).
See Jones v. R.R. Donnelly, 541 U.S. 369, 282 (2004); 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2008).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2009).
146. Id.
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after the agency issues the right-to-sue letter since the filing of the claim
with the EEOC puts the employer on notice of the need to preserve
evidence.
The effect of having such a draconian statute of limitations is to
preclude claims. The enforcement of anti-discrimination law is driven
by individuals recognizing and bringing claims.147 As Hirsch & Lyons
noted, “Perception of discrimination is arguably the most important
stage in dispute formation in that it determines the likelihood of
subsequent mobilization of the law.”148 Hirsch & Lyons continue,
“[M]obilization of the antidiscrimination regulatory framework requires
that workers identify negative experiences, attribute them to race
discrimination, and bring them to the attention of regulatory agents.”149
However, an employee may not realize that she was the victim of
discriminatory conduct in such a brief period.150 Studies have shown
that individuals may not perceive conduct as discriminatory until viewed
as part of a spectrum of events over time.151 As Brake & Grossman
have observed, claiming may be delayed by an individual’s lack of
information regarding discrimination, deficit in processing information,
and perceptions of fairness and what outcomes are possible and
deserved.152
The recent Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., Inc. illustrates
this problem.153 Lilly Ledbetter sued under Title VII for pay disparities
between her and male co-workers and a jury found evidence of
discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit held that her claims were untimely
because the inequitable pay decisions had been made more than 180
days prior to her bringing her complaint, and the Supreme Court
affirmed this ruling.154 The Court rejected her argument that the act of
paying her less with each successive paycheck was an individual
147. Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process of Title VII,
with individual complaints serving as the catalyst to initiate the Commission’s investigatory and
conciliatory procedures. As the Supreme Court noted, “[A]lthough the 1972 amendment to Title VII
empowers the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains an essential
means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
45 (1974).
148. Elizabeth Hirsch & Christopher J. Lyons, Perceiving Discrimination on the Job: Legal
Consciousness, Workplace Context, and the Construction of Race Discrimination, 44 LAW & SOC’Y.
REV. 269, 291 (2010).
149. Id. at 271.
150. See id. at 271–75; Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 873 (2008).
151. Id. at 872–73; see also Hirsch & Lyons, supra note 148; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major,
A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
801, 803–06 (2006).
152. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 150, at 872.
153. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
154. Id. at 621.
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discriminatory act sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.155
There was a public outcry after the decision in Ledbetter, prompting
Congress to pass the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.156 The Act
provides that, “a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice
that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid
pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
and for other purposes.”157
The case and resulting legislation
demonstrate the tension between recognizing discriminatory conduct as
it manifests itself in the workplace and taking action within the short
statute of limitations provided by the employment discrimination
laws.158
Moreover, even where an individual recognized discrimination and
wants to pursue redress, the short statute of limitations period can make
it difficult for a plaintiff to marshal sufficient facts and information to
bring a claim. While it is true that an individual does not need an
attorney to file a charge, she at least needs enough information to
articulate a claim on the EEOC intake form that provides sufficient
information for the agency to commence an investigation.
Once the agency issues a right-to-sue letter, a plaintiff only has the
even shorter ninety-day period to bring suit, an inadequate period of
time in which to find an attorney and have that attorney gather sufficient
information to file a complaint. If an individual cannot find legal
counsel, she will either have to forgo legal redress or navigate the
bramble of the judicial system on her own. Indeed, there is an argument
that employment discrimination plaintiffs should be given a longer
statute of limitations than plaintiffs in other types of cases, such as
commercial litigation, because they are individuals and tend to be less
familiar with the law and less able to obtain legal assistance than the
complainants in commercial litigation, which are often times companies
with in-house counsel and law firms at their disposal.159
With or without counsel, the short filing period is also problematic for
gathering the facts needed to draft a well-pled complaint. The problem
of this short filing period is further compounded by the Supreme Court’s

155. Id. at 629–33; see also Friedman, supra note 76.
156. Pub. L. No. 111-2 (2009).
157. Id. Although the Ledbetter Act has presently been applied only to pay claims, there is a
question whether the language is broad enough to extend the limitations period for other types of
discrimination claims as well. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead? The Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499 (2010).
158. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 150, at 872. (“[A]n employee may not realize that she
has experienced discrimination in time to protect her rights . . . [A]n employee may be unable to
recognize discrimination, and insufficiently motivated to act to challenge it, until the effects of
discrimination are felt and accumulated.”).
159. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 150, at 880–90.
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recent decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly160 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.161
Prior to Twombly, courts had recognized the more liberal pleading
standard of Conley v. Gibson requiring plaintiffs to plead only some set
of facts entitling the plaintiff to relief.162 However, in Twombly, the
Court held that a plaintiff is required to plead allegations that plausibly
state a claim on the face of the complaint.163 The Court held that rather
than merely taking a quick look at the complaint, district courts should
first carefully examine the complaint to separate pure “legal
conclusions” resting on the other “factual allegations.”164 After
removing those legal conclusions, district courts should weigh the
remaining facts and determine if they are sufficient to render the
plaintiff’s claim plausible.165
The new standard developed in Twombly and Iqbal has significant
implications for the short statute of limitations in employment
discrimination cases. It is more important now than ever that a plaintiff
has the facts to bring a well-pled complaint or otherwise face dismissal
of her claims and plaintiffs need time to do that. The short limitations
period also means a plaintiff may be able to bring only the allegations
which are still timely, resulting in an incomplete picture of the
discrimination which occurred and providing thin evidence, which
makes a claim more susceptible to dismissal at the summary judgment
stage.166
Finally, the unduly short statute of limitations for most antidiscrimination claims frustrates the preventative and non-litigious
elements of the modern anti-discrimination legal landscape. For
example, under Faragher–Ellerth framework, an individual is required
to take advantage of internal complaint mechanisms unless it is
unreasonable to do so under the circumstances. However, filing an
internal complaint does not toll the statute of limitations for purposes of

160. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
161. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
162. See 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
163. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545–50.
164. Id. at 564–66.
165. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Iqbal further clarified the Twombly standard in a case in
which an individual detained by the FBI brought discrimination claims under the First and Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision and held that the plaintiff did
not plead sufficiently detailed allegations. Although Iqbal was a constitutional case, the fact that it
involved discrimination claims make it likely applicable in the employment law arena. See generally
Sullivan, supra note 122.
166. There is a potential counterargument that employment discrimination plaintiffs do not need a
longer period of time in which to articulate their complaints because they have the many months during
which the claim is pending with the administrative agency. However, many facts may not become
available until the fact-finding process has been completed. Only then will an individual be able to find
counsel.
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the discrimination statutes. Thus, an individual who raises an internal
complaint may be required to file a charge with the EEOC while the
internal investigation is still pending in order to have a timely cause of
action. This has the negative effects of rendering the internal complaint
procedure moot and needlessly taxing the resources of the EEOC where
a potential internal resolution still exists.167
In sum, the very short statutes of limitations provided by most antidiscrimination laws combined with the requirements to exhaust
internally and bring an administrative charge results in a large number
of claims being dismissed as untimely.168
IV. PROPOSAL
The purpose of anti-discrimination law is to eradicate unlawful
discrimination and harassment from the workplace.169 However, the
anti-discrimination claiming system as presently constructed contains
broad exclusions and restrictions, which arbitrarily exclude a large
number of individuals and claims for reasons unrelated to the merits of
those claims. The narrow constraints of the claiming system are in
direct tension with the law’s broad aspirations. Such limited and
piecemeal protection makes widespread realization of the antidiscrimination mandate impossible.
Yet despite the problems presented by the barriers to access, such
requirements cannot be eliminated wholesale. First, as discussed in their
respective sections above, these structures do have some value. For
example, the administrative exhaustion requirement, if properly
conceived, can play a role in mediating and conciliating disputes.
Similarly, a statute of limitations requirement prevents claimants from
unduly sitting on their rights and then bringing stale claims about which
the employer has had no notice or ability to preserve documents,
witnesses, and other evidence.
Additionally, in contemplating access, legitimate countervailing
concerns such as overburdening must be taken into account. Indeed,
those against liberalization of the employment discrimination claiming
system would argue that such reform would open up the floodgates and

167. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme
Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 981 (2007).
168. Legislation has been introduced on a number of occasions to extend to two years to make it
more consistent with other federal laws but has been defeated or vetoed for political reasons. Brake &
Grossman, supra note 150, at 869.
169. See 109 CONG. REC. 25688 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1963) (noting that the purpose of Title VII is
to “. . . eliminate, through the utilization of formal and information remedial procedures, discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin”).
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make the system unworkable.170 Adopting such an argument—that
access to remedies should be limited in order to not flood the system—
essentially reflects a value judgment that would place the rights of a
small subset of individuals above the ability for all to seek redress. This
is clearly contrary to the purpose of Title VII.
However, any proposed structural reform must be made with an eye
toward the larger implications for the court system. The question then is
how can the system be reconceived in a way that provides widespread
access while enabling the system to function effectively?
Scholarship addressing this issue is scant. Very few articles have
been written about the harsh and exclusionary nature of the small
business exemption, administrative exhaustion requirement and statutes
of limitations in employment discrimination law and virtually nothing
has been written about the ways in which these operate together to
exclude a great number of claims, or about the asymmetries among the
laws with respect to each of these elements and their consequences.
Instead, recent scholarship has focused on the ways in which claims are
cast within the courts, focusing on whether the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework adequately encompasses the kinds of bias
seen in the workplace or whether the rigid constructs of the system
exclude intersectional and other types of claims.171 However, the
literature does not acknowledge that the very claiming system it purports
to deconstruct excludes many potentially valid claims, thereby rendering
any proposed reforms of only limited utility.
This Article seeks to break new ground by suggesting that the
claiming system can and should be restructured to achieve the broader
goals of anti-discrimination law. Access can be broadened to include all
individuals and provide them with a clearer path to pursuing their
claims, while taking into account the countervailing overburdening
concern. The solution to the access problem lies not in elimination of
access requirements, but in making them work together in a way that
makes sense. The key is a reconceptualization of the EEOC.
A. Reform of the EEOC
Reform of the anti-discrimination claiming system needs to begin
with the simple premise that workplace discrimination is unacceptable
and must be eradicated. Indeed, even those who support the present
limited structure of the claiming system do not suggest that small
business employees are undeserving of protection, but rather that the

170. See Selmi, supra note 109.
171. See supra note 8.
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realities of overburdening and cost justify their exclusion.172 The
question then is how best to provide widespread access while enabling
the system to function most effectively. Any consideration of such
reform should begin with the EEOC.
The notion of reforming the EEOC is not a novel one. A number of
scholars have looked at the gap between the intent and actuality of the
agency and its inability to fulfill its mandate and suggested reforms.173
For example, Nancy Modesitt suggests a refined role for the EEOC,
such as focusing only on certain high impact cases while leaving other
individuals to seek private attorneys to pursue their claims.174 However,
as Michael Selmi correctly notes, while such a proposal would reduce
agency workload, it is contrary to one of the EEOC’s most important
mandates: providing access to this claiming system.175
This Article posits that the EEOC should be reconceived as a tool to
broaden access to anti-discrimination law. Specifically, this may be
achieved by: (a) amending the statutory definition of “employer” for
purposes of Title VII and the other anti-discrimination statutes to
include all employers, regardless of size, thereby bringing all employers
within the purview of the statutes and their prohibitions against
discrimination; and (b) requiring individuals working for employers who
fall below the minimum employee threshold to pursue claims
exclusively through the EEOC, which would be given an adjudicative
role. Reconceiving the avenues to justice and the role of the EEOC
would bring all employees within the protection of anti-discrimination
law while taking countervailing concerns such as overburdening and
cost into account.
The concept of giving the EEOC power to adjudicate claims is not in
itself novel. Indeed, Congress contemplated such a scheme in creating
the agency before settling upon the investigative and enforcement
functions that exist today.176 More recently, the Committee on Long
Range Planning of the Judiciary Conference of the United States issued
a report recommending that Congress empower administrative agencies
as a means of reducing the judicial caseload.177
The report
recommended that “[C]ongress and the agencies concerned should be
encouraged to take measures to broaden and strengthen the
administrative hearing and review process for disputes assigned to

172. See Carlson, supra note 28.
173. See Modesitt, supra note 111, at 1257; Selmi, supra note 109.
174. Cf. Modesitt, supra note 111, at 1257.
175. See Selmi, supra note 109, at 49.
176. See 109 CONG. REC. 25688 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1963).
177. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 75–76 (1995) [hereinafter Long Range Plan].
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agency jurisdiction . . . .”178
Clearly this additional role would be a significant additional workload
for the agency and more funding and resources would be needed. In
order to reshape the role of the EEOC, the agency’s function with
respect to larger businesses should be revamped. Instead of requiring
mandatory exhaustion of all claims before going to federal court,
employees of those employers with fifteen or more employees should
have the option of either filing a charge and pursuing the agency route
exclusively or proceeding directly to federal court (essentially an
election of remedies).179
The revamping of the EEOC to focus on those who do not have
access to the courts would have a number of powerful effects. First, it
would ensure that every employee has access to some form of redress
within the employment discrimination claiming system, regardless of
employer size. Second, it would relieve those plaintiffs who do not need
the agency’s assistance in bringing a claim from onerous and pointless
exhaustion requirements.
Reconceptualizing the EEOC would give it a function consistent with
its intended purpose. At present, the administrative process has become
little more than a bureaucratic roadblock on the inevitable road to court.
However, there is a role to be played by the EEOC in the modern antidiscrimination claiming system: to provide access to those who cannot
find legal representation or otherwise need help. Ironically the
administrative process could be most useful for those who presently do
not have access to it because they are excluded from the scope of Title
VII. Indeed, these individuals most need the assistance of the EEOC
because they work for small companies that are less likely to have their
own complaints procedures or where the alleged perpetrator of the
discrimination may stand in the way of the internal complaint route.180
Providing small business employees with EEOC adjudication also
takes into account the employer cost consideration. As set forth more
fully below, a streamlined adjudicative process which could be
undertaken without the assistance of counsel would have significantly
less cost implication for small business than full-scale litigation.
Finally, the proposal ameliorates concerns about overburdening the
courts by providing EEOC adjudication as the venue for redress for
claims against small business. It would also avoid overburdening the
agency by relieving some of the present caseload and allowing the
178. Hearing Before the H. S. Comm. on Social Security, 105th Cong. 105–11 (1997).
179. Indeed, some state systems which do not require administrative exhaustion of discrimination
claims essentially offer election of remedies whereby claimants have the opportunity to pursue remedies
in an administrative forum rather than going to court. Belt, supra note 111, at 167.
180. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 22, at 709.
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agency to focus its resources where its assistance is most needed and
beneficial. This would eliminate duplication between the agency and
the judiciary because claimants would have to elect one forum to pursue
claims, rather than taxing the resources of both.
Beyond the theoretical reconceptualization of the EEOC, there are
myriad complex questions as to the practical redesign, the answers to
which are beyond the scope of this Article and the subject of another
study in their own right. But it is helpful here to highlight the most
important questions surrounding the agency’s reconfiguration:
The nature of the adjudicative function. Should the EEOC’s
adjudicative function involve administrative law judges, whose
decisions would be appealable in federal court? Or should it take a form
more analogous to arbitration?181 The challenge will be to create a
procedure that ensures a full and fair hearing, and that results in a final
determination with limited right to appeal, so that proceedings are not
routinely duplicated on appeal.182
The adjudicators. There is a related question as to who would
adjudicate claims: would the judges be existing EEOC investigators, or
new personnel? What training would be required?
The adjudicative procedures. An important question concerns the
procedural and evidentiary rules that such an adjudicative function
would entail. Should the procedures be more formal and mirror the
rules of discovery, in order to give plaintiffs a process as close to
litigation as possible, or should they be more informal, in order to
streamline proceedings and keep costs low?
The location of the adjudicative function. The housing of the
adjudicative law function in the EEOC, which until now has primarily
served a one-sided role in advocating on behalf of employees, may be
problematic and limit the agency’s credibility as an impartial
adjudicating body. This paper contemplates the adjudicative function
within the EEOC and the solution may involve the reconfiguring of the
EEOC to have a more balanced approach, perhaps with renaming or
with changes in personnel. However, it is also possible to conceive of
placing the adjudicative function with a different entity, such as a board
housed within the Department of Labor.
The duties of the existing EEOC. As discussed more fully in Part
III(B), supra, the EEOC presently has a number of duties, including
investigating, mediating and settling disputes. Arguably, if the
adjudicative function is placed elsewhere, then the EEOC could
continue some of its existing duties. However, to the extent that the
181. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
182. See Long Range Plan, supra note 177; see also Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for
Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992).
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adjudicative function is housed within the EEOC, careful consideration
must be given to the relationship to its enforcement role, including
workload, resources, and potential conflicts of interest.
Remedies. The question of anti-discrimination remedies is generally
beyond the scope of this paper but warrants mention in its interplay with
any broadening of access. Should the remedies in EEOC adjudication
mirror those in the courts? In the purest sense, the imperative to widen
anti-discrimination protection suggests that individuals who have
suffered the same wrongs and violations of rights should not be entitled
to any less. However, the concerns about judgments being unduly
burdensome on small business may warrant modifications in some of the
more drastic remedies available in court, such as punitive damages.183
Relationship to State Agencies. The newly conceived agency would
present challenges to the present work-sharing system whereby either a
state or federal agency investigates a claim. Still to be determined is
whether the EEOC should adjudicate all claims or whether state
agencies that have a similar adjudicative function should be able to hear
them.
The answers to these and the many related questions are the subject of
their own article, and more research is needed to understand fully the
design specifics which would best enable the goal of widening access to
anti-discrimination law. For purposes of fully understanding the
proposal set forth in this Article, however, it is worthwhile to identify
certain key mandates that the new adjudicative regime would need to
follow. First, the process must afford claimants full and fair hearing of
their claims subject to the legal standards in the applicable employment
discrimination statutes. This will help to fulfill the overarching goal of
increased access to employment discrimination law in order to both
protect individual rights and further the anti-discrimination mandate.
Employer cost concerns must also be taken into account. Thus, the
procedures and discovery should be kept as straightforward as possible.
Additionally, assistance must be provided to both employer and
employee sides so that they may proceed through the system without the
need for counsel.184 The program should also contain a robust
mediation component to encourage the parties to resolve their dispute
without the need for adjudication. The system should also have an
183. Research suggests that there may be value to individuals to having their claims heard in a
relatively short timeframe, and for some a “quick-and-dirty” form of justice may appeal, even where it
offers less monetary compensation. See generally Friedman, supra note 76; Nourit Zimerman & Tom
R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 473 (2010).
184. See Summers, supra note 182 (noting that plaintiffs are at a considerable disadvantage, even
when opposing small business, in terms of both familiarity with the claiming system and access to
information).
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educational and support function and mediation in order to help small
businesses offset compliance costs.
The proposal is not flawless. One criticism is that by limiting certain
claims to agency-only adjudication, some plaintiffs are essentially being
relegated to second-class justice. Such criticism essentially mirrors
concerns about mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination
claims in that they restrict redress to a forum short of the judicial
system.185 Admittedly, the proposal stops short of full access to the
judicial system for all: a tacit recognition of the tension between access
and efficiency and the need to maintain some restraints on the courts’
workload in order to keep them in operation. Moreover, for those
individuals who receive no protection whatsoever in the employment
discrimination claiming system, access to the EEOC for redress would
be a vast improvement. Unlike mandatory arbitration of discrimination
claims, which restricts individuals to a forum short of that to which they
are statutorily entitled, the proposal opens up administrative
adjudication as a venue for redress for individuals who presently have
none.
A second potential issue is that despite the pragmatic constraints the
proposal purports to include, the system would nevertheless be further
taxed by these reforms. Undoubtedly, opening the system to a wider
number of individuals and claims will increase the work at both the
administrative and judicial levels. More claims will be brought to the
EEOC by persons who were previously excluded by virtue of employer
size, and some individuals will still choose to file with the agency rather
than pursue litigation. Some claimants who might have otherwise not
pursued claims beyond the charge stage may now proceed directly into
court. Additional research is needed to determine the extent of the
increased administrative and judicial workload in order to determine
what resources may need to be added or relocated.
A final issue is feasibility. Sweeping reforms such as those proposed
by this Article cannot take place without legislative reform. The
problem, of course, is whether or not such change is possible,
particularly in an era of economic hardship and a conservative Congress
which may not be willing to open the floodgates to more litigation and
government expenditure at the expense of business.186 However, the
reforms are not as anathema to business interests as they may seem.
185. Critics of mandatory arbitration frequently argue that the system is skewed in favor of the
employer because the arbitrators are biased toward the employer. See Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost –
How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights,
12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1994).
186. “[A] general misperception, one that has been fueled by the popular anti-employment
discrimination rhetoric often financed by conservative interest groups . . . .” Michael Selmi, Why are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001).
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First, it is important not to confuse the interests of the small business
lobby with the concerns of business overall. Subjecting all business to
some form of anti-discrimination law will level the playing field and
remedy the current situation in which small businesses are getting a free
pass from anti-discrimination regulatory constraints. This may appeal to
big business. Second, the proposed reforms which would allow
plaintiffs in larger organizations to bypass the administrative process
and proceed directly to court would actually result in cost savings for
larger businesses because those businesses would not have to go through
duplicative proceedings at the agency and in court.
B. Two-Year Statute of Limitations
The proposal to reconfigure the EEOC would largely address the first
two barriers to access. It would provide a forum in which all employees
could bring claims, regardless of employer size and would also
eliminate the burdensome, duplicative and unproductive administrative
exhaustion requirement by requiring individuals to pursue either the
agency or, where eligible, federal court as the exclusive remedy.
However, still present is the problem of an unduly short statute of
limitations.
This problem is most pronounced for those statutes that follow the
Title VII scheme of 300 days to file a charge and then ninety days from
agency dismissal to file in court. The revisiting of the EEOC model
offers the ideal opportunity to address the statute of limitations problem.
Elimination of the two-step administrative exhaustion requirement
means that individuals would not have to comply with the dual 300then-ninety day framework. This Article suggests that a two-year
statute of limitations is the appropriate replacement. First, a two year
statute of limitations would give employees needed additional time to
marshal facts, craft a well-pled complaint and in the case of federal
litigation secure counsel if not proceeding pro se. This would give
employees a more reasonable period of time in which to recognize
claims and gather facts and information and secure an attorney if
possible and desired. However, it is not so long as to unfairly prejudice
employers with the staleness or loss of witnesses and evidence. It is also
not significantly longer than the cumulative 390 days under the existing
statutory framework. Thus, it does not put a much larger burden on
employers with respect to notice. It also strikes a balance between the
shorter prior statute of limitations and the longer four year statute of
limitations offered by some statutes such as USERRA and Section 1981.
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V. CONCLUSION
The anti-discrimination claiming system as presently structured
excludes a large number of individuals and claims for reasons other than
their merits by imposing arbitrary and overly stringent barriers to access
including employer size, administrative exhaustion, and the statute of
limitations. The law should be revised to protect all individuals and
those who work for small employers should be given remedy in an
EEOC that has been empowered to adjudicate claims. Other individuals
should be able to elect between the assistance of the EEOC and opting
out of the administrative process to proceed directly to court. The
statute of limitations should be increased to two years at a minimum.
The asymmetries among the barriers to access in anti-discrimination law
should be further studied to determine if their effects are significant
enough to warrant possible harmonization.
Widening access to the claiming system will bring a significant
number of individuals who are presently excluded within the purview of
the law so that they can earn a living unencumbered by discrimination
and harassment. Such comprehensive protection is essential to fulfilling
the law’s broad aspirations of eradicating discrimination in the
workplace.
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